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Abstract: 
 
Diaspora networks' role in supporting and stimulating entrepreneurial activities in Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) economies need hardly be elaborated. For instance, some SSA countries have 
established government agencies to encourage diasporas to help local communities and provide 
policy advice. At the 2003 Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Governments, the African Union (AU) amended Article Three of its Constitutive Act to invite 
and encourage African diaspora's active participation. However, institutional changes associated 
with diaspora networks are a phenomenon that has been noted but poorly understood. This paper 
addresses a little examined intersection between the diaspora literature and the institutions 
literature. We examine the contexts, mechanisms and processes associated with diaspora 
networks' roles as institutional change agents in the context of entrepreneurial behaviors in SSA 
economies. Our dependent variables are measures of changes in institutions associated with 
diaspora network. We have related our analysis mainly to the nature of the diaspora networks 
compared to other networks, characteristics of the environments in which diaspora networks are 
embedded in and operate, and some activities, mechanisms and modes that serve to transmit 
institutions from the host country to the homeland. 
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Article: 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Diaspora networks' roles in stimulating entrepreneurial activities in the developing world need 
hardly be emphasized (e.g., Mercer et al, 2009; Isenberg, 2008; Kshetri, 2007a, 2013; Portes, 
1996). Economies in SSA represent a fertile ground for studying the influence of diaspora 
networks' roles in entrepreneurship development. This is because of the simple fact that 
diasporas associated with SSA economies constitute the single biggest sources of financial 
inflows to Africa (Mbaye, 2011). For instance, according to the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), African diasporas remitted US$60 billion to their homeland in 2012 (Nzeshi, 
2013). A report of the World Bank and African Development Bank indicated remittances from 
Ugandan diasporas account for 20 percent of the total investments in Uganda in recent years 
(ugandanconventionuk.org, 2013). According to the World Bank, Nigeria is the fifth biggest 
recipient of diaspora remittances. 
 
Although the substantial diaspora remittances provide a clear economic benefit to the SSA 
economies, it is apparent that non-economic benefits associated with the diaspora networks could 
be even more significant. The central idea in this paper is that from the standpoint of 
entrepreneurship in the SSA economies, entrepreneurship-related institutional changes that can 
be attributed to the diaspora networks are potentially even more important. 
 
The concept of remittances has been broadened from an exclusively economic term to include 
social, political and cultural contributions such as transfers of entrepreneurial skills, experience, 
ideas, technology and knowledge as well as cultural and civic awareness in their ancestral 
homeland (Levitt, 1998; Saxenian and Sabel, 2008; Nyberg-Sorensen, 2004). Businesses owned 
by diaspora networks establish partnerships with private and public sector organizations in an 
attempt to break formal, as well as informal institutional, barriers to entrepreneurship (Kshetri, 
2007a). The diaspora networks' possible roles in bringing entrepreneurship-friendly institutions 
in the SSA economies have received much attention in the popular press and policy debates (e.g., 
Annan, 2011). For instance, the Diaspora policy has been a key component of Rwanda's long-
term development plan (Box 1). Some researchers have suggested that cross-border diaspora 
networks act as a substitute to compensate for the "imperfect domestic institutions" in the 
developing world (Nanda and Khanna, 2008). 
 
Institutional changes associated with diaspora networks differ widely across economies in terms 
of scale, scope and characteristics. Such changes are affected by the specific contexts, 
institutional setting, history and other factors (Kshetri, 2011). 
 
Against the backdrop of potentially important roles of the diaspora in changing entrepreneurship-
related institutions in the SSA economies, notably lacking from the diaspora networks literature 
is explicit attention to the contexts, mechanisms and processes associated with such changes. 
This is a serious gap in the literature because various interrelated trends, as discussed above, are 
making diaspora groups and their views politically, socially and economically important. 
 
There are at least three interrelated reasons why diaspora networks are in a position to bring 
institutional changes in their ancestral homelands. First, diaspora networks are transnational in 
nature but tend to have a high degree of proximity - relational, positional and spatial - to their 
homeland. Prior research indicates that while transnational networks facilitate international trade 
by overcoming informal barriers, domestic network facilitate barriers by collusion (Rauch, 
2001). Theoretically, this logic can be extended to argue that diaspora networks tend to be in a 
better position than most domestic networks in breaking institutional barriers to entrepreneurship 
in the developing world. No less important is the fact that because of a high degree of proximity, 
they can have a strong influence on the information and behavior of various institutional actors 
in their homeland (Rice and Aydin, 1991). 
 
Box l. Rwanda's initiatives to capitalize on its diaspora networks to maximize the social 
remittance 
 
Following the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, Rwanda mainly focused on rebuilding economic 
infrastructure and thus, diaspora engagement was not a high priority for the country. President 
Kagame, who came to power in 2000, set Rwanda's goal to increase the GDP by seven times 
over a generation. His government's Vision 2020 plan aimed at transforming the coffee- and 
tea-growing country into a middle-income, service-based economy by 2020. In the early 
2000s, Rwanda started to recognize the key role of its diaspora in achieving high economic 
growth (Black, McLean Hilker and Pooley, 2004). A country of five provinces, Rwanda also 
refers to its diaspora community as the sixth province (igihe.com, 2011). 
 
In 2001 the Rwanda government launched the Rwanda Global Diaspora Network (RGDN), 
which was an independent association led by Rwandan diasporas. In the same year, the 
government also established a department on diaspora engagement in the Ministry of External 
Relations and Internal Cooperation (MINAFFET). In 2008, the government established 
Diaspora General Directorate (DOD) (http://www.rwandandiaspora.gov.rw/), which 
exclusively focuses on and serves Rwandan diaspora networks. The DGD's mission and vision 
include mobilizing Rwandan diaspora for the "national development of their motherland." In 
2009, the Ministry of External Relations and Internal Cooperation published the Rwanda 
Diaspora Policy (Republic of Rwanda, 2009). The new policy document considered the 
diaspora as a key component of the Vision 2020. The Government of Rwanda also works 
closely with a number of international organizations such as International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), the Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
effectively utilize its diaspora networks for the country's economic and social development 
(Fransen and Siegel, 2011). 
 
The total amount of remittances received from Rwandan diaspora networks increased from 
US$43 million in 2005 (Fransen and Siegel, 2011) to US$100 million in 2010, which was 
more than 1.5 percent of the country's GDP (Provost, 2012). The increasing focus of the 
government and private sector organizations on attracting Rwandan diaspora networks to work 
in the country indicates an emphasis placed on the role of the social remittance. Among other 
things, Rwanda's DOD provides information on vacant posts in the country, especially in 
public institutions (Rwanda Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2010). In December 
2011, the MINAFFET, Job in Rwanda Ltd. and Wakening Abilities for the Future (WAF) 
organized the first career day for the Rwandan diaspora networks. The theme of the career day 
was "Inspiring Careers in Rwanda." The idea is to provide Rwandan diasporas the opportunity 
to meet with organizations and discuss about the possibilities of collaborating with them as 
consultants and promote their organization and marketing their product and services 
(igihe.com, 2011). These initiatives have produced clear, positive effects that have benefitted 
Rwanda with significant social remittance. The Return of the Diaspora-Rwanda 
(http://www.julieddl.be/index.php?/project/the-return-of-the-diaspora-rwanda/) has 
documented a number of Rwandan diasporas with significant experiences as entrepreneurs, 
engineers, journalists, managers, artists and specialists in a number of areas such as marketing, 
finance, insurance and international relations in the West and other African countries that 
returned to Rwanda to contribute to their homeland's development. 
 
Second, an enormous body of literature has documented the globalization-led institutional 
changes (Campbell, 2004). In this regard, the issue of institutional changes associated with 
diaspora networks is rather important because personal globalization (e.g., consisting of 
telephone calls, travel and remittances) is one of the important dimensions of globalization (e.g., 
Globalization Index (GI) developed by Foreign Policy and AT Kearney, Foreign Policy, 2007). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that social remittances associated with diaspora networks 
could be a trigger in bringing entrepreneurship-related institutional changes in the developing 
world. 
 
Third, because of political and economic globalization, national economies are weakening 
whereas diaspora networks have been empowered (Holm and Sørensen, 1995). For instance, 
some SSA economies have established government agencies to encourage diasporas to help local 
communities, and provide policy advice (Ratha et al., 2011). At the 2003 Extra-Ordinary Summit 
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments, the AU amended Article Three of its 
Constitutive Act to "invite and encourage the full participation of the African diaspora as an 
important part of the continent" (cf. Davies, 2010). 
 
Despite the above observations, most research on the diaspora's contributions to the homelands 
has focused primarily on economic remittances (Brinkerhof, 2008). In little research have 
scholars examined diaspora networks' roles in bringing changes in entrepreneurship related 
institutions in the developing world. Therefore, this analysis will bridge a gap in the literature by 
providing a possible explanation for the diaspora-led institutional changes, which is based on the 
natures and characteristics of the host and home countries and the focal industry as well as on 
various links established by the diaspora networks. The central argument of this paper is based 
on the idea that diaspora networks are an important change agent because of the transnational 
character and proximity with the homeland. Furthermore, this paper argues that the amount of 
changes they are likely to bring depends on national and industry-level institutions in the home 
country and the host country's institutions' conduciveness to entrepreneurship and the extent to 
which they provide opportunities to develop and internalize entrepreneurship-related values, 
skills, knowledge and orientation. In this way, the intangible resources associated with the 
diaspora such as skills, ideas, work ethics and their potential to bring institutional change are no 
less important than the tangible economic remittances. 
 
At this point, some clarification is in order. We define the diaspora groups as ethnic/national 
groups migrated from their ancestral homeland to a foreign country, referred to in this paper as 
the host or the destination country (Kitching et al., 2009). The migration could be temporary as 
well as permanent. In the remainder of the paper, we first provide a brief literature review and 
examine important concepts related to diaspora and institutional changes. Next, we analyze the 
contexts, mechanisms and processes associated with diaspora-led institutional changes. This is 
followed by a section on discussion and implications. The paper ends with some concluding 
comments. 
 
2. Diaspora Groups and Institutional Changes: Some Anecdotes, Observations and 
Political Characters 
 
2.1. Diaspora Greeks in their ancestral homeland in the nineteenth century 
 
Diaspora groups can challenge the traditional conception, assumptions and views about 
businesses in their homeland. A nice and striking example to illustrate this comes from the 
investment of diaspora Greeks in their ancestral homeland in the nineteenth century. The Greek 
diaspora groups from the Ottoman territory, mainly the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea 
region, brought with them codes of business, which were new by the Greek standard 
(Exertzoglou, 1988). In the beginning, most local businessmen considered the diaspora as a 
group of speculators and viewed their business activities as based on nonproductive practices 
(Xenos, 1869, cited in Chatziioannou, 2008). However, the diaspora group introduced new 
entrepreneurial practices such as stock exchanges and large-scale public works and redirected 
economic resources in entrepreneurial ventures that yielded higher economic returns (Sombart, 
1913 [1998]). Consequently, the new capitalist ethics and the diaspora's risk taking propensities 
became an important societal force that brought new entrepreneurial ideas to individuals and the 
government; and shaped and reshaped the Greek entrepreneurial landscape (Chatziioannou, 
2000, 2008). Overall, economic and social patterns formed in the Greek diaspora community had 
favorable and long lasting impacts on entrepreneurial development in Greece (Minoglou, 2007). 
 
2.2. Twentieth century and the current century 
 
Fast forward to the last decades of the twentieth century and the current century, when we can 
see successful and interesting examples of diaspora-led institutional changes in the developing 
world. Diaspora's contribution in rebuilding the Taiwanese economy has been mainly in the form 
of social rather than economic remittances. In the 1980s, the Taiwanese government approached 
the diaspora in the West. It consulted and solicited views from executives with Taiwanese roots 
working in the United States and established formal forums to collect their inputs, which were 
used to formulate and implement various programs (Isenberg, 2010). 
 
In the same vein, the overseas Chinese have been at the forefront of important initiatives needed 
in the formation of social organizations promoting entrepreneurship (Kshetri, 2007b). Likewise, 
entrepreneurial firms created by diaspora Indians have helped improve quality and complexity of 
services and moved away from focusing merely on low cost (Saxenian, 2006b). Silicon Valley-
based Indian managers played instrumental roles in the development of MNC development 
centers in Bangalore and contributed to entrepreneurial resources (Saxenian, 2003). Likewise, 
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that the African diaspora has transferred skills 
and brought innovations in Africa (Annan, 2011). Some SSA economies such as Rwanda, 
Ethiopia and Kenya have created "diaspora bonds" to encourage the involvement of their 
diasporas in development projects (Provost, 2012) (See Box l for Rwanda). 
 
Even in Arab economies, the diaspora has been a central force in bringing institutional changes. 
Many members of Arab diasporas have returned from Western countries, who are in political and 
business leadership positions in their home countries and have brought important political 
changes (Kshetri and Ajami, 2008). 
 
2.3. The political dimension of diaspora-led institutional changes and its variability across 
economies 
 
The above examples are suggestive of institutional changes associated with diaspora networks 
caused by coercive, normative and mimetic pressures. However, a "one-size-fits-all" approach is 
not helpful in understanding entrepreneurship-related institutional changes associated with such 
pressures and thus, promoting changes. Diasporas' decisions to return to their homelands are 
likely to be the result of a process with-simultaneously-numerous underlying causes, push-as 
well as pull-factors. For instance, while China put forward a combination of economic and 
patriotic arguments and motivations to attract its diaspora community in diverse sectors, 
including scholars and professionals, India has traditionally lagged behind on this front. 
However, in recent years overseas Indians, mainly in the Silicon Valley, have forced Indian 
politicians to introduce diaspora-friendly policies. Likewise, while diaspora-led institutional 
changes in some economies are limited to a specific industry (e.g., offshoring in India), others 
have experienced such changes on broader scales and levels (e.g., Taiwan). 
 
The processes related to enactment and formation of new legislations and regulations, as well as 
their implementation, are likely to face an array of challenges. Especially, economies such as 
China that are characterized by a strong state and a weak civil society are likely to follow a top-
down approach in the formulation and implementation of entrepreneurship related policies. In 
such economies, diaspora networks are likely to have limited ability to push for broad social and 
political changes. In China's case the only possible significant change seems to be through 
mimetic pressures. 
 
In India, on the other hand, religious, social, economic and political associations have offered a 
viable set of examples encouraging the development of many new trade and professional 
associations (Frankel, 2006). A strong mutual interdependence between the state and the private 
economic actors, particularly organized business groups, has developed very quickly. Therefore, 
the liberalization resulted in the shift of trade associations' institutional locations. More 
specifically, their roles are not just limited to indirect causal chains and externality effects. Put 
differently and more succinctly, their direct effects have become more prominent. 
 
Diaspora networks are characterized by different degrees of formalization and the varied nature 
of their relationships with the governments in their ancestral homelands. For instance, most 
Indian diaspora networks tend to be loose and informal networks organized around community, 
faith and religion based associations. On the other hand, the Nigerian diaspora networks are 
formal, albeit loose. Likewise, diaspora-government cooperation is arguably more 
institutionalized in Egypt, Ghana or Morocco than in Cameroon (Ying et al., 2010). 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
3.1. Factors affecting the transfer of ideas, technology and knowledge from the source to the 
potential adopter or receiver 
 
As noted above, diaspora networks have the potential to transfer ideas, technology and 
knowledge and promote institutional reforms in their homeland (Levitt, 1998; Saxenian and 
Sabel, 2008). Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests the diffusion rate of these ideas, 
technology and knowledge are a function of where they originate from, the broad environment, 
including social, cultural, political and economic forces in the home and the host countries, 
characteristics of the potential adopting units, as well as characteristics of the focal ideas, 
technology and knowledge (O'Neil et al., 1998). 
 
Research conducted at the organizational level has indicated organizations mimic other 
organizations in the same industry, outside their industry but similar in complexity, or those "on 
the cutting edge" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). We can extend this logic to consider how ideas, 
technology and knowledge related to the natures of organizations associated with diaspora 
networks and the host countries are likely to be perceived in their homeland. 
 
It is also important to consider possible interaction effects and relations between the source and 
the potential adopter or receiver of ideas, knowledge and technology. In this regard, researchers 
have found that the degree of proximity between the two parties is an important variable 
affecting the diffusion rate of ideas, knowledge and technologies. Communications researchers 
have observed that various proximity mechanisms - including relational, positional and spatial - 
affect the extent to which the source affects behaviors, practices and interests of the potential 
adopter or receiver (Rice and Aydin, 1991; Rice, 1993). 
 
3.2. Institutions and institutional changes 
 
Institutions are "macro-level rules of the game," which include formal constraints such as rules, 
laws, constitutions; as well as informal constraints such as social norms, conventions and self-
imposed codes (North, 1996). Scott (2001) has proposed three institutional pillars - regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive. They are related to "legally sanctioned behavior," "morally 
governed behavior" and "recognizable, taken-for-granted behavior" respectively (Scott et al., 
2000). The regulative pillar can be mapped with formal institutions while normative and cultural-
cognitive pillars are related to informal institutions. 
 
From the standpoint of entrepreneurship, some examples of regulative institutions include 
government organizations' assistance and special supports to start businesses, special preference 
and priority accorded to new and small businesses for government contracts and the 
government's sponsorship of organizations that help new businesses develop. Cognitive 
institutions include individuals' knowledge and experience related to legally protecting a new 
business, dealing with and managing risks and finding information about markets for their 
products. Normative institutions include admiration of entrepreneurs and that of entrepreneurship 
as a career path, and entrepreneurial process, societal views about innovative and creative 
thinking (Busenitz et al., 2000). 
 
An understanding of the phenomenon of institutional change is of particular relevance for this 
paper. Institutions arguably have a higher propensity to change when they are characterized by 
contradictions that "create conflicting and irreconcilable incentives and motivations" (Campbell, 
2004). 
 
A simple approach to understand institutional changes associated with the diaspora networks 
would be to look at the various contradictions institutions embedding the diaspora networks 
produce with institutions in their homeland. Looking from this perspective, institutional changes 
can be seen as an outcome of the dynamic interactions of contradictions and "praxis" (Seo and 
Creed, 2002). Seo and Creed (2002) have proposed four sources of contradiction: "(l) legitimacy 
that undermines functional inefficiency, (2) adaptation that undermines adaptability, (3) intra-
institutional conformity that creates inter-institutional incompatibilities, and (4) isomorphism that 
conflicts with divergent interests." These are arguably accumulated results of organizations' 
continuous isomorphic adaptations (Bums and Nielsen, 2006). First, conformance to the existing 
institutions may be at the expense of technical and functional efficiency. Second, continuous 
isomorphic adaptations may lead to psychological and economic "lock-in" and "competency 
traps," which may undermine further adaptability. Put differently, "adaptive moves make 
adopters less able to adapt over the long run" (Seo and Creed, 2002). Third, the legitimacy 
seeking process may require appeasing multiple institutions that are conflicting and inconsistent. 
Finally, misalignment between institutions and the divergent interests of actors embedded in the 
institutions may lead to contradictions. 
 
3.3. Institutional change agents 
 
It may be helpful to consider the roles of diaspora networks as institutional change agents or 
institutional entrepreneurs. Institutional entrepreneurs challenge or disrupt particular models of 
social or economic orders and construct new organizational fields (Bartley, 2007; Daokui et al., 
2006; Schramm, 2006; Svejenova et al., 2007). They "lead efforts to identify political 
opportunities, frame issues and problems, and mobilize constituencies" and "spearhead collective 
attempts to infuse new beliefs, norms and values into social structures" (Rao et al., 2000). They 
also engage in activities related to deinstitutionalization or dissolution of existing logic or 
governance structure as well as institution formation, which entails the birth of a new logic or 
governance structure (Scott, 2001). 
 
Institutional entrepreneurs' "subject positions" need to be dominant, which allows them to gain 
wide legitimacy, bridge diverse stakeholders and compel other actors to change their practices 
(Hoffman, 1999; Maguire et al., 2004). It is important for them to mobilize external and internal 
constituents, have financial resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and be able to communicate 
with other institutional actors in the system so their initiatives are perceived favorably 
(Groenewegen and van der Steen, 2007). 
 
Theorization or "the development and specification of abstract categories and the elaboration of 
chains of cause and effect" is an important process through which institutional entrepreneurs 
facilitate the diffusion of new ideas (Greenwood et al., 2002). Theorization provides rationales 
for the practices to be adopted and thus, increases the likelihood of acceptance of the practice 
(Strang and Meyer, 1993). Two key elements of theorization concern framing and justifying. 
Framing focuses on the need for change and justification is value of the proposed changes for 
concerned actors (Greenwood et al., 2002). 
 
 
3.4. Social movement organization 
 
One way to understand institutional changes associated with a diaspora network, especially a 
more formalized one, is to view it as a social movement organization, defined as "a complex, or 
formal, organization which identifies its goals and preferences with a social movement or a 
countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Prior 
researchers have suggested social movement organizations help construct and develop new 
cognitive frameworks, norms, values and regulatory structures (Sine and Lee, 2009). These 
organizations play important roles to undermine and weaken existing institutions and to develop 
new institutional arrangements (Hiatt et al., 2009). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Diaspora network's role in bringing changes in formal and informal institutions related to 
entrepreneurial activities in their home country. 
 
4. Contexts, Mechanisms and Processes Associated with Diaspora-led Institutional Changes 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the process associated with a diaspora network's transmission of host country 
institutional characteristics to bring changes in formal and informal institutions related to 
entrepreneurial activities in the home country. Our framework is based on the idea that although 
diaspora networks clearly are an important change agent because of their transnational character 
and proximity with the homeland, the amount of change they are likely to bring also depends on 
national and industry-level institutions in the home country, as well as the host country's 
institutions' conduciveness to entrepreneurship and the extent to which they provide 
opportunities to develop and internalize entrepreneurship-related values, skills, knowledge and 
orientation. Moreover, because this paper's focus is on entrepreneurship-related institutions, 
diasporas ' engagement in entrepreneurial activities are probably most relevant and important. 
Therefore, additional elements of the framework come in the form of isomorphic pressures 
associated with diasporas' engagement in entrepreneurial activities, both in their home and host 
countries. Our dependent variable concerns the change in institutions associated with diaspora 
networks. 
 
4.1. Diaspora networks vs. domestic networks 
 
Prior research indicates transnational networks and connections are inherently more progressive 
than local ones (Mercer et al., 2009). Because of their transnational character, diaspora networks 
can overcome informal barriers (Rauch, 2001). This superiority of diaspora networks vis-a-vis 
domestic networks may be even greater in developing economies, which tend to be characterized 
by thin, weak or missing institutions to stimulate entrepreneurial activities (Nanda and Khanna, 
2008). 
 
From the developing world's perspective, compared to domestic networks, the diaspora networks 
are more likely to consist of high achieving individuals who can bridge diverse stakeholders and 
influence other actors to change their practices (Hoffman, 1999). They may also possess the 
capability to mobilize external and internal constituents (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). In 
addition, they may come up with approaches to successfully theorize the adoption of 
entrepreneurship related institutions by appropriately framing and justifying. 
 
There have been highly visible efforts by diasporas to change institutions in their homeland. One 
example is the Sudanese-British entrepreneur, Mo Ibrahim, who emphasized the need to change 
institutional arrangements in Africa: "The World Bank should refuse to fund any project which is 
not regional. African governments must be pressed to regionalize their economies and stop being 
53 little countries, each with their flag, jealously watching each other" (Smith, 2009). As another 
example, U.S.-educated Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo has been a fierce critic of 
institutions in Africa. She forcefully argued that foreign aid in the SSA economies has deepened 
the poverty, led to an economic distortion and fuelled corruption and inequality in the continent. 
She has advocated alternatives such as encouraging trade and foreign direct investment with the 
continent and developing micro-financing and capital markets. In the above examples, because 
of prior success and a Western exposure, Ibrahim and Moyo have a favorable subject position to 
bring institutional changes. They have effectively framed issues related to deficiency of 
institutions and have made attempts to deinstitutionalize entrepreneurship-unfriendly institutions. 
 
4.2. Diaspora network vs. MNCs owned by non-diaspora 
 
From the developing world's perspective, the presence of firms with transnational scope, 
irrespective of whether owned by diasporas or non-diasporas, is associated with the stimulation 
of entrepreneurial activities. Prior research has documented various spillover mechanisms such 
as skilled labor turnovers, enterprise spin-offs, demonstration effects and supplier-customer 
relationships associated with MNC's activities that facilitate the diffusion of entrepreneurial 
culture and innovation (Cheung and Lin, 2004; Kshetri, 2008). 
 
Table 1. A summary of factors related to diaspora-led institutional changes in the SSA 
economies. 
 
 
Diaspora networks often occupy an important position in the society. To take an example, the 
diaspora Greek merchants became a part of the elite business community (Minoglou, 2007). 
Moreover, diaspora communities maintain a close proximity with the homeland as they often 
collaborate with former classmates and colleagues (Saxenian, 2006b). Because of a high degree 
of relational proximity (Rice and Aydin, 1991), businesses practices are more likely to be 
affected by information, influence and behavior associated with the diaspora networks than those 
associated with average MNCs. Moreover, the transmission of institutions through organizational 
socialization (Chao et al., 1994) is likely to be higher in diaspora-owned businesses compared to 
those owned by other MNCs. Overall, a low degree of proximity acts as barriers to the 
transmission of institutions and technology associated with a MNC owned by non-diasporas. 
 
4.3. Characteristics of the homeland 
 
4.3.l. Western-educated leaders and technocrats 
 
Some diaspora associations build initial connections to their homelands through relationships 
with policymakers (Saxenian, 2006b). Therefore, the degree of proximity with policy makers 
affects the extent to which diaspora networks can influence national policy. In this regard, 
communications researchers have observed various proximity mechanisms including relational, 
positional and spatial (Rice and Aydin, 1991).  
 
Governments consisting of Western-educated policy makers tend to have a high degree of 
relational proximity with diaspora networks. Western-educated policy makers and diaspora 
networks also have a high degree of positional proximity because of similar roles, obligations, 
status and expectations (Burt, 1980) and thus, the two groups compare with and agree to each 
other's terms (Erickson, 1988). 
 
A high proximity makes it easier to bridge the gap between the government and diaspora 
networks. Diasporas can communicate effectively with the government and mobilize resources 
and government officials. Looking from this perspective, they have the potential to be effective 
institutional entrepreneurs. 
 
It is worth noting that governments controlled by coalitions with internationalist links typically 
consist of sophisticated technocratic teams with foreign training and experience, who tend to 
carry reform measures early and consistently (Glasser, l995; Stallings, 1992). They are likely to 
possess knowledge and ability to understand adaptations required for institutional changes 
(Minsky, 1996). Technocrats and bureaucrats help precipitate institutional changes by directing 
attention and providing supports and resources (Kshetri and Ajarni, 2008). Evidence consistent 
with this proposition has emerged from Mexico, Thailand, Korea and the Middle East (Glasser, 
1995). In sum, politicians, bureaucrats and technocrats with internationalist links are Likely to 
perceive collaboration with diaspora network to bring entrepreneurship-friendly changes as a 
win-win situation. 
 
4.3.2. Industry-level institutions: Nascentness of institutions 
 
Compared to established industrial sectors, in nascent and formative sectors (e.g., high 
technology and offshoring), institutions are thin. For instance, there is often no developed 
network of regulatory agencies in such sectors (Powell, 1993). Prior research indicates 
associations such as those associated with diasporas can work closely with state agencies 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). This logic also can be extended to the process of institutional 
changes associated with diaspora networks. In some situations, the state will collaborate with 
such associations and networks to rationalize an arena of activity (Scott, l992). 
 
India's NASSCOM, which was headed by a diaspora in the early years of its evolution during the 
1990s, is used here as an example to illustrate this point. NASSCOM collaborated with 
government agencies at various levels, which benefited both parties. Ex-NASSCOM head, 
Dewang Mehta helped 19 state governments in India draft IT policies (Voicendata, 2006). Thus, 
diaspora networks played an important role in strengthening the regulative institutions by 
providing the state with their expertise in developing a new regulatory framework and 
strengthening the enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Perhaps even more important, NASSCOM has developed and enforced industry codes and 
standards in Indian offshoring industry. Much of the credit of the remarkable progress in Indian 
offshoring firms ' success goes to NASSCOM, which has played a phenomenal role in 
monitoring the industry behavior and bringing significant institutional changes. Most obviously, 
when the state's regulatory roles are weak, trade associations such as NASSCOM can help fill 
the regulatory vacuum (Kshetri and Dholakia, 2009). The activities of industry associations are 
components of normative institutions (e.g., Scott et al., 2000). 
 
Academic research and anecdotal evidence also suggest diaspora networks' contribution in the 
deinstitutionalization of entrepreneur unfriendly practices and values is likely to be more 
prevalent in a nascent sector compared to an established one. Entrenched interests of economic 
and political elites and existing institutional arrangements tend to constrain the ability of new 
players such as diaspora networks in bringing such changes in the traditional sectors. An explicit 
example illustrating this statement comes from India. A small number of well-connected 
industrialists have dominated the Indian economy and protected themselves from outside 
competition (Weitzman and Fontanella-Khan, 2011). Petras (2008) notes that most Indian 
billionaires built their wealth by "using economic power to secure neo-liberal policies." Similar 
points can be made about most SSA economies. Some SSA economies have realized this issue. 
For instance, Nigeria's policy has been to encourage diasporas to invest in the country's emerging 
industries (Nzeshi, 2013). 
 
4.4. Host country characteristics and diaspora-led institutional changes in the home country 
 
Immigrants with origins in the SSA economies are scattered across economies with various 
levels of economic development and diverse orientations toward immigrants. From a SSA 
economy's standpoint, there appear to be important qualitative differences in the institutions that 
are transmitted by immigrants hosted by economies with diverse characteristics. That is, 
depending upon the country of origin, a given level of economic remittance may translate to 
various levels of social remittances. For instance, a Nigerian diaspora with education, skills or 
experience gained in the United States or Switzerland are likely to play more positive roles in 
bringing institutional changes in their home countries than those in Saudi Arabia (Mercer et al., 
2009). Anecdotally speaking, although U.S.-based Indian entrepreneurs have taken back-office 
functions as well as R&D works to India, Indian diaspora networks based in developing 
economies such as Africa and Middle East are not in a position to do so. 
 
Considering the transmission of entrepreneurship-related institutions, diaspora networks can be 
viewed as intermediation agencies between the host country and the homeland. In this regard, 
diaspora networks' potential to transmit entrepreneurship friendly institutions in the home 
country is a function of entrepreneurship related institutions in the host country as well as an 
opportunity to assimilate with the population and observe entrepreneurial and business practices, 
behaviors, activities and culture in organizations. Countries hosting diaspora networks (or 
immigrants) differ widely in terms of entrepreneur-friendliness of institutions and orientation 
toward immigrants. For instance, formal and informal institutions facilitating the birth and 
growth of entrepreneurial firms are weak or missing in developing countries (Nanda and Khanna, 
2008). On the other hand, developed countries such as the United States have environments to 
facilitate high impact entrepreneurship (Schramm, 2004). 
 
Host countries differ in their orientation toward immigrants (Lobo and Salvo, 1998; Rumbaut, 
1999), which affect diaspora networks' skill levels, experiences and ideas that can be potentially 
transmitted to their homeland. In terms of orientation toward immigration, consider Simon's 
(1998) categories. Simon's first group views immigrants as an extra source of labor. Economies 
in this group include South Africa, the Gulf States, Gabon and Asian emerging economies. In the 
Middle East, for instance, recruiters organize most of the movements of workers on fixed term 
contracts. In most cases, contract workers are required to depart the receiving country upon 
completion of the contract. Moreover, they are not permitted to bring family members with them 
(Lucas, 200l). A low level of legal protection for immigrants and their limited assimilation into 
the host culture inhibits their internalization of entrepreneurial values and ideas. The sense of 
temporariness or a lack of permanence may act as a barrier to access high quality entrepreneurial 
ideas. Benefits to immigrants through processes such as organizational socialization in the 
transmission of institutions from the organization to the employees are likely to be limited (Chao 
et al., 1994). 
 
The "old" immigration countries of Western Europe and North America, as well as Australia, 
New Zealand and Israel form Simon's second group. These are arguably the most open countries 
for immigrants with well-institutionalized programs. Immigration policies are "routinized, 
expansionary, and inclusive" (Freeman, 1997). They explicitly or implicitly allow immigrants to 
stay permanently. Immigrants get social and legal protection and the acquisition of nationality is 
an important issue (Simon, 1998). 
 
4.5. Changes associated with diasporas' engagement in entrepreneurial activities 
 
Most SSA economies are characterized by ineffective entrepreneurship-related practices. Various 
actors' conformance to the existing institutions tends to hamper ideas that may lead to high 
quality entrepreneurial ventures and initiatives (Seo and Creed, 2002). In this regard, businesses 
established by diaspora networks, which may be physically located in the homeland or the host 
country, can have various linking mechanisms to bring changes in institutions in the homeland. 
In this section, we discuss such changes in terms of businesses as well as business connections 
established by the diaspora networks in their homeland. 
 
4.5. l. Businesses established by the diaspora in the homeland 
 
Diaspora networks associated with SSA economies are found to engage in the establishment of 
businesses in their homeland. In recent years, some international agencies are also encouraging 
diasporas to establish innovative businesses in SSA economies. One such example is the African 
Diaspora Marketplace (ADM). According to the Chief Innovation Officer and Director of the 
Office of Innovation and Development Alliances at USAID, promoting the ADM's mission 
includes "supporting African diaspora entrepreneurs who are looking to create innovative, 
sustainable businesses in their country of origins" (Kriss, 2012). 
 
Prior research indicates that businesses owned by diaspora networks are likely to introduce new 
and innovative business models and practices (Kshetri, 2007a). For instance, many family-owned 
businesses established by diaspora members in China attribute their success to "manufacturing 
excellence, innovative culture and growth orientation towards niche-exports" (Poutziouris et al., 
2002). 
 
Overseas Chinese returnees provide illustrative examples of how diaspora-owned businesses can 
influence institutions related to entrepreneurship. Overseas Chinese in Asia have developed 
complex and dense social organizations and institutions (Wu and Wu, 1980; Moore, 1997). In 
recent years, they are developing similar institutions in China. Wang (2001) documented the 
evolution of a "club culture" in China, which has promoted innovation and risk taking. Overall, 
Chinese returnees have contributed in producing synergies and in "thickening" existing 
institutions (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Keeble et al., 1999). Saxenian (2006a) refers to this as the 
phenomenon of "brain circulation." 
 
In a discussion of Chinese culture and entrepreneurship, the nature of venture capital (VC) 
deserves attention. In China, most VC funds are linked to the government, which cannot accept 
the Western level of risk taking. They can be considered more like loans rather than equity 
financing and an incubator losing such funds often becomes a target of official criticism (Harwit, 
2002). Overseas Chinese perform better in risk taking behaviors (Moore, 1997). In this regard, 
successful entrepreneurial spin-offs from Chinese returnees may induce and promote risk taking 
behaviors among the Chinese as a result of mimetic isomorphism. In this regard, one way to 
view Chinese diaspora networks is as social movement organizations, which have helped 
undermine and weaken existing institutions (e.g., risk aversion) and develop new institutional 
arrangements (e.g., risk taking) (Hiatt et al., 2009). 
 
Many developing countries are characterized by persisting societal perception that bright and 
capable people do not pursue entrepreneurship as a career. They are in desperate need of an 
entrepreneurial role model. Successful entrepreneurial ventures established by the diaspora may 
trigger a change in societal perception of entrepreneurs. Individuals who are experienced 
entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial role models are likely to improve the image of entrepreneurs 
and increase the attractiveness of entrepreneurship as a career (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994). 
Various studies have documented how diaspora Greeks acted as role models in the 18th and 19th 
century (Minoglou, 2007; Xenos, 1869; Sombart, 1913 [1998]; Chatziioannou, 2000; 
(Chatziioannou, 2008). Network theory suggests potential entrepreneurs are more likely to be 
influenced by successful entrepreneurs in their own ethnic networks compared to non-ethnic 
ones (Rice and Aydin, 1991). 
 
Successful entrepreneurial ventures run by the diaspora may gain legitimacy by creating 
economically favorable conditions in the societies and undermine functional inefficiency 
associated with traditional business practices. In this way, such ventures may act as a source of 
institutional changes by creating a contradiction (Seo and Creed, 2002). 
 
In some cases, diaspora entrepreneurs are likely to promote practices considered to be 
unconventional by the norms of their homeland. For instance, observers have noted that 
entrepreneurial firms run by returnees tend to focus on transparency, minimization of hierarchy 
and venture capital-based entrepreneurship, whereas traditional businesses are dominated by 
inefficient state-owned or family-run firms (Saxenian, 2006b). Therefore, diaspora networks are 
in an important position to generate positive externalities in the homeland. Their practices and 
orientations are likely to be imitated by other organizations through mimetic isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
 
 
 
4.5.2. Business connections established by the diaspora with the homeland 
 
Diaspora networks are connected to their homeland through "strong" as well as "weak" ties 
(Granovetter, 1973). In addition to family, friends and ethnic connections, businesses owned by 
immigrants in the host country may create various networks to draw on wider market and 
institutional contexts associated with the homeland (Kloosterman and Rath, 2001; Rath and 
Kloosterman, 1999). For instance, China's and India's rise in entrepreneurial profiles can be 
attributed to the various links provided by the highly qualified overseas Chinese and non-resident 
Indians with the high-tech clusters in developed countries, which facilitated the creation of 
successful entrepreneurial ventures (Kuznetsov, 2006). 
 
Prior researchers have noted the important roles of diaspora-based connections for businesses 
conducted by immigrants in the host country (Kitching et al., 2009). Diaspora communities are 
connected to the homeland by various networks. In China's case, they are also known as the 
'bamboo network' and an ' invisible empire' (Seagrave, 1996; Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996). 
Diaspora networks' ties to their ancestral homeland can facilitate access to goods that can be sold 
in Western counties (Stoller, 2002). Kitching et al. (2009) found that family, friends and other 
networks in their ancestral homeland acted as suppliers for businesses such as coffee supplies, 
herbal ingredients, furniture, handicrafts and signage, which were established by Chinese and 
Vietnamese immigrants in London. 
 
Diasporas build alliances with classmates, friends, families and social networks in their 
homeland. For instance, some African diaspora associations provide information on investment 
opportunities and sourcing in their homeland and facilitate contacts between traders in their host 
and origin countries (Ratha et al., 2011). Likewise, immigrant entrepreneurs from SSA 
economies share information, develop contacts and establish trust in Africa as well as in the 
United States (Portes, 1996). Thus, diaspora communities identify under-utilized entrepreneurial 
ingredients such as skill, talent and knowledge in their homeland and link them into global 
networks (Saxenian, 2006b). 
 
For many potential entrepreneurs in SSA economies, diaspora networks are becoming a reliable 
channel, which facilitate access to information, funding, talent, technology and contacts 
(Isenberg, 2008). Moreover, businesses networks associated with diaspora networks are more 
effective, if only for the simple fact they are more transnational. The networks may help connect 
businesses in the country of origin to the value delivery networks of the diasporas' businesses 
(e.g., customers' customer and suppliers' suppliers). 
 
Prior research indicates that coercive pressures by customers or other powerful members of the 
value delivery networks affect an organization's strategy (Bates, 1997). For instance, American 
and European organizations' adoption of TQM practices is considered a response to coercive 
forces. In this regard, SSA-based firms are also facing coercive pressures from businesses owned 
by the diaspora networks, which have acted as suppliers and customers. Such connections may 
lead to changes in entrepreneurial orientations in terms of factors such as product quality and 
response time, delivery efficiency and flexibility in dealing with orders of various sizes (Schmitz 
and Knorringa, 2000). 
 
5. Discussion and Implications 
 
In this paper, we examined the contexts, mechanisms and processes associated with diaspora-led 
institutional changes in the developing world, with special emphasis on SSA economies. Our 
analysis provided insights into the complexities of institutional changes associated with the 
diaspora and suggested the indirect intangible benefits may be even more significant than the 
tangible economic component. In this way, we extended prior research by explicitly focusing on 
institutional changes associated with diaspora networks. Therefore, this research contributes both 
to our understanding of diaspora networks' effects in bringing institutional changes in the 
developing world, and to the growing body of research on stimulation of entrepreneurial 
activities by the diaspora networks. 
 
The framework is offered as a starting point for researchers interested in studying diaspora-
related institutional changes. Empirical work on institutional changes associated with diaspora 
networks has not yet commenced, and we anticipate that measurement of the various constructs 
proposed in this paper will be difficult. 
 
Evidence from some successful economies such as Taiwan indicates that institutional changes 
associated with the diaspora networks may help them move from the peripheral position 
(Saxenian, 2006b). Likewise, diaspora of Indian professionals have played an important role in 
the development of the Indian IT sector (Wadhwani, 2004). These success stories have prompted 
policy makers to recognize the importance of diaspora-led institutional changes. In this regard, 
we provide a framework for policy responses, which links domestic and international measures 
with changes in formal and informal institutions (Table 2). The framework would help policy 
makers maximize the dividends associated with diaspora. 
 
If there is a lesson in successful economies' utilization of diaspora networks, it is that in addition 
to more reactive measures such as changes in regulations in response to pressures from 
diasporas, governments need to engage in proactive activities such as inviting the diaspora 
community to represent and participate in the national policy-making as well as inviting input, 
feedback and suggestions. In many economies, some efforts are underway and steps have been 
taken in this direction, albeit mostly symbolic in many economies' cases. For instance, 20 of the 
150 seats in the AU's Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), are reserved for 
diaspora organizations (Oladeinde, 2006). Likewise, Recommendation 10 of the UN Global 
Commission on International Migration (GCIM) has emphasized diasporas' participation in 
"transnational knowledge networks" in addition to the existing focus on encouraging saving and 
investment (UN, 2006b). However, substantive results are yet to be achieved from such 
initiatives. 
 
In many SSA countries, benefits associated with diaspora networks' underlying social 
contributions are not fully realized because of a misguided sole focus on the economic 
remittances. Given the potentially important role of the transfer of various skills in 
entrepreneurial development (Brinkerhof, 2008), policy interventions may need to have a clear 
and explicit focus on the social remittances component. The examples discussed above indicate 
an economy may especially benefit by developing formal and informal mechanisms to link high 
achieving expatriates (Isenberg, 2010). 
 
Table 2. A framework for policy responses. 
 
 
However, as a result of inertia effects and a lack of successful adaptations into a new 
environment created by the globalization, many developing countries have not been able to 
benefit from the diaspora networks' potential to bring institutional changes. Their failure to shift 
from old orientation may be attributed to a lack of understanding of diasporas' roles in the 
changing social, political and economic climates. Governments in the developing world need to 
direct more efforts toward buttering up the diaspora networks. Domestic and international efforts 
aimed at improving formal and informal institutions related to entrepreneurship are important 
(Table 2). Taiwan's experience indicates that international efforts to attract diasporas to represent 
and participate in the national policy-making and to start businesses can pay off brilliantly to the 
economy of the homeland. Once the diasporas are attracted, more formalized efforts at the 
domestic level would help accelerate the rate of institutional change. For example, policy 
frameworks are needed to engage the diaspora in providing advice and mentorship to support 
entrepreneurial activities (Commission on the Private Sector and Development, 2004). SSA 
economies also need policy efforts to enhance absorptive capacity of domestic firms and 
strengthen linking mechanisms of diaspora-owned businesses with the domestic economy. 
 
It is also important to create favorable conditions for diaspora networks on the home front. In 
SSA and other parts of the world, there are examples of creative and successful efforts, which 
have fostered opportunities for greater levels of participation by diaspora communities. For 
instance, the government of Rwanda reached out to the diaspora networks by emphasizing on 
"diasporic unity" and encouraging communication among various diaspora groups as well as 
with the government (Fransen and Siegel, 2011). Starting in the early 1990s, many municipal 
governments in China had established high tech development zones, which had venture parks 
that exclusively targeted returning students. In addition to low rent, tax relief, shared 
infrastructure and financial benefits, the parks addressed special needs of returnees. They 
included dealing with the bureaucratic process related to residency, housing and special schools 
for their children (Saxenian, 2003). Such activities have helped network, share and fertilize high 
quality entrepreneurial ideas. 
 
Finally, in the SSA economy's context, diaspora networks' activities and the resulting institutions 
tend to be biased toward a global focus and the formation of relatively large enterprises. These 
initiatives are likely to be of little value in serving local markets, which often consist of poor and 
illiterate consumers. Therefore, government policies should not ignore the needs of indigenous 
entrepreneurial activities, which often tend to be of small scale and local or regional appeal. 
Policy initiatives are needed that focus on the involvement of the diaspora networks in the 
construction of institutions through a process of bricolage (e.g., Campbell, 2004), which entails 
borrowing the most appropriate elements from the North and applying them in the unique 
institutional context of the developing world. In this connection, it is important to point out that 
some foreign multinationals have taken initiatives to apply the western approach of business and 
management in the context of the developing world. For instance, Citibank operates in the Arab 
economies according to the principle of Commercial shariah. Another example is Barclays' 
collaboration with Susu money collectors in Ghana to collect savings from informal traders who 
lacked access to banking. Barclays provides Susu collectors with training and lending. These 
approaches can be regarded as an example of complementarity because two seemingly 
contradictory phenomena (Western institutions' capitalism and Commercial shariah) are 
combined and essential characteristics of each component are preserved (Bohr, 1963; Potter, 
2004). Although the approaches of multinationals such as Citibank and Barclays are successful, 
diaspora networks, because of a higher degree of proximity and understanding of local 
institutions, are in an even better position to employ a bricolage process so benefits to the local 
community can be maximized. 
 
5.1. Future research 
 
There are several implications of the above discussion for future research into the diaspora-
institutional change nexus. Mercer et al.' s (2009) study indicated that although diaspora 
networks may be active in their host country in the west, in many cases, the "center" is the 
ancestral homeland such as in Africa. Future research may benefit considerably from 
incorporating the center-periphery model in a discussion of diaspora-led institutional changes 
and examining various factors that determine the degree of centerness of the ancestral homeland. 
 
In future conceptual and empirical work scholars need to compare and contrast various cultures 
related to the diaspora networks' ancestral homeland in terms of the institutional changes 
associated with such networks in their homeland. For instance, researchers could benefit from 
understanding how the diaspora communities' loyalty to the homeland and various networks they 
form (e.g., China's guanxi networks) contribute to institutional changes. 
 
The nature of entrepreneurial practices that diffuse from foreign firms owned by diaspora versus 
those owned by non-diaspora may differ. In this regard, future researchers may seek to study the 
extent to which practices imitated by local firms in SSA economies from diaspora-owned firms 
are similar and different from those imitated from non-diaspora owned MNCs. 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
 
The preliminary evidence presented in this paper suggests diaspora networks influence 
entrepreneurial behaviors and institutional changes directly as well as through indirect causal 
chains and various forms of externalities. In this way, they play more substantial roles than 
merely substituting for the imperfect domestic institutions as identified in the prior research. In 
both national and international policy circles interested in developing entrepreneurial activities in 
the developing world, it is important to develop a comprehensive diaspora strategy designed to 
have large-scale impacts on the broader community. 
 
The potential of institutional changes associated with diaspora networks stems from the fact 
these networks are transnational but, at the same time, have a high degree of proximity to their 
homeland. Such networks generate externalities and spillovers to the economy in various ways. 
Networks created by diaspora communities are likely to be more effective in helping diffuse high 
quality entrepreneurial ideas than those created by both domestic networks and multinationals 
associated with non-diaspora sources. The common culture, values and social norms increase 
proximity and establish mutual understanding and trust. 
 
The diaspora networks' physical location seems to be of less relevance. In some cases, they may 
physically return to the ancestral homeland. In other cases, they may be located in the host 
country but can engage in various activities that can lead to changes in entrepreneurship related 
institutions in their ancestral homelands. 
 
Although some economies such as China and Taiwan have used diaspora networks as a means to 
achieve their policy objectives, many SSA economies have not been able to do so. The 
conception and delivery of a quality entrepreneurial environment is crucial to attract diaspora 
networks with the highest potential to bring institutional changes in the homeland. However, 
once such an environment is developed, it is likely to provide positive feedback showing a 
virtuous circle and self-reinforcing improvement in institutions. 
 
Finally, all diaspora networks are not created equal. Diaspora networks that possess skills and 
experiences are likely to stimulate and facilitate the process of "brain circulation" and help bring 
positive changes in institutions in their homelands. The SSA economies must exploit the 
opportunities afforded by diaspora networks while minimizing the risks associated with 
undesirable and less desirable kinds of migrant networks such as those involved in human 
trafficking and illegal migration (Savage and Harvey, 2007; UN, 2006a). Such networks 
contribute to the creation of institutions that promote unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship rather than productive ones. The SSA economies also need to ensure the 
reliance on diaspora networks has no negative effect on incentives to innovate domestically. 
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